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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
a preference in the case of insolvent state banks has no justification
whatever and that it occupies a peculiar position of being dis-
owned even by its beneficiaries, the bonding companies. It is
further one of those rare classes of case where the West Virginia
Supreme Court may reverse its former holding without interfering
either with its system of logical principles or with any vested social
or economic interest which had been built up under the former
rule.
-T. W. ARNOLD,
GiFT OF A LiFE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE PowERn or .DisPosAL BY
DFED.-A testator ought to be permitted to dispose of his property
by will in accordance with his desires, and if his intent appears
from his language, such intent should be effectuated by the law
unless there are good reasons of policy to the contrary. But there
have been rules of property law which have operated to defeat
intent. The classic example is the Rule in Shelley's Case, which
in this state is partially abolished by statute,' and should the
proposed revision of the Code be enacted by the Legislature will
be completely destroyed. Such a rule of construction of words,
which is entirely contrary to the ordinary meaning of such words
as understood by the layman, is a dangerous trap for one who
makes a will or conveys property by deed. The courts of Vir-
ginia, in a case officially published in 1871, followed some thirty
years later by those of West Virginia, have established another
dangerous trap for one who makes a will or deed which is on a
par with the notorious Rule in Shelley's Case. This is the now
firmly established rule of property law that where there is a gift
for life, followed by a general power to dispose of the fee by deed,
the estate created is not a life estate with power of disposal, but
is an absolute fee simple estate. 2 Like the Rule in Shelley's
Case this is a fixed rule of construction of language, and
the courts hold it means what the one who used it clearly did not
mean. A recent case 8 furnishes an example of the operation of
this rule. A testator by the fourth clause of his will devised all
the residue of his property to his wife "for and during the term
of her natural life . . .to be used and enjoyed by her for her
1 CODE OF W. VA., oh. 71, § 11.
2Ogden v. Maxwell, 104 W. Va. 553; 140 S. E. 554 (1927); National
Surety Co. v. Jarrett, 95 W. Va. 420, 121 S. E. 291 (1924) ; Blake v.
Blake, 92 W. Va. 663, 115 S. E. 794 (1923); Morgan v. Morgan, 60 W Va.
327, 55 S. E. 389 (1906).
3 Ogden P. Maxwell, supra.
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sole use, benefit and support, with full power and authority to
sell, deed, grant and convey any and all real estate that may be
necessary, or found expedient so to do for the maintenance, com-
fort and support of my wife." A following clause made a
gift over all property undisposed of at the death of the wife.
The entire estate was appraised at less than $8000. The
intent of the testator seems plain. He desired his wife to
have comfortable support during her life, and as the income
might well prove inadequate, he gave her power to dispose of
the real estate so that she could use the proceeds for her sup-
port if she so desired, but such property including any rem-
nant of the proceeds as she did not so use he gave as directed in
later clauses of the will. He certainly did not intend to give her
an absolute fee simple. If he had so intended he would have done
so and would not have added any more to his will. But the tes-
tator's intent was defeated by holding that the wife had an
absolute fee simple. Having so decided the court then assumed
that the gift over in the later part of the will was void. - It is
a settled rule of law, not a mere matter of construction, that by a
general power of disposition following a gift of a life estate the
testator expresses his intention to give a fee simple. There seems
.no particular reason for this unless the courts believe this is what
the power of disposition clearly means. They say that this is the
dominant intent of the testator, while the intent to give a life
estate is a secondary intent which must give way to the incon-
sistent dominant intent. Of course the testator himself was -not
aware of his dominant intent. The court provided him with that.
Had he been aware of it he would have used other language. He
believed he gave a life estate with a power of disposition. The
courts do not seem to deny but that a life estate with a power is
possible. I There is no policy urged against it. I In fact such a
thing has been known and upheld for centuries in other jurisdic-
4 If the devise is of a fee to A and if he fails to convey during his life-
time, then on his death without issue surviving over to B and his heirs, Mr.
Kales plausibly contended the gift over ought to be sustained. See KALFA
FUTURE INTERESTS, §§ 717, 719, citing Doe v. Glover, 1 Com. Bench 448
(1845) as being to this effect. In Ogden v. Maxwell supra the gift over was
not on failire of issue.
5 This was held in Milhollen v. Rice, 13 W. Va. 520 and its propriety
was recognized in Englerth and Rowland v. Kellar, 50 W. Va. 259, 40 S. E.
465 (1901) ; "If the primary or dominant intent be to create a, life estate,
then such intent will prevail over words indicating an absolute and un-
limited power of disposition...." Morgan v. Morgan, supra, at page 333.
6 This was expressly recognized in Morgan v. Morgan, supra, which is the
case which established the rule in this state. See excerpt from this ease
in the note above.
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tions and if it is now impossible to create in this state it is only so
because the courts arbitrarily say the general power of disposal in
itself constitutes a fee simple gift. The testator is thus held to
have made the very foolish mistake of giving a life estate and a
fee simple in the same land to the same person.
Is there any reason of policy why a creation of a life estate with
a general power of disposition attached should not be permitted?
Is there a reason sufficiently strong to justify defeating the testa-
tor's intent as expressed in his will? The courts have never argued
that such was the case. On the contrary they seem to admit that
such a life estate followed by such a power is possible and will be
upheld when the dominant intent appears to be to give a lifo
estate. The only argument is that the general power following a
life estate expresses the testator's intent to give a fee simple, and
if this is his dominant intent then it follows the attempt to give
a life estate is a mistake and must be disregarded. The cases
which seem finally to have established this rule of law are May
v. Joynes I in Virginia decided in 1871 and Morgan v. Morgan 8 in
West Virginia decided in 1906. The older cases of Burwell v.
Anderson 9 and Mzlhollen v. Rice 10 are not authority for the rule
as it has been established. The latter case carefully explains that
where there is an express gift of a life estate, it will not be en-
larged into a fee simple by a general power of disposition follow-
ing. Judge Green carefully explains that formerly a gift to A
followed by a general power of disposition, was construed to give
A a fee simple, because since no words of limitation were used,
the gift to A was a life estate, and courts would construe such a
gift as a fee if there was other language in the will to indicate
a fee was intended. The general power of disposition was taken
as justifying the construction giving A a fee. But this of course
did not apply where the gift was expressly to A for life. The gift
to A generally is now by statute a gift in fee simple so the former
construction has fallen into disuse.
'Perhaps a word might be said as to the policy of the law against
restraint on alienation. If there is a gift of a fee with power to
dispose of the property by deed only, followed by an attempted
gift over at the death of the donee, the latter gift may be void
because the gift of the fee with power to convey by deed amounts
to a restriction on the donee's power to devise, and therefore may
be void as a restraint on alienation. But in the matter under
T20 Gratt. 692, (Decided in 1857 but published in 1871).
8 60 W. Va. 327, 55 S. E. 389 (1906).
93 Leigh 348 (1833).
1o 13 W. Va. 510 (1878).
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consideration the courts have contrary to the apparent intent of
the testator, made the gift a gift of a fee, and having done so of
course then it may be argued the gift over is contrary to the
policy against restraints on alienation. But where there is a gift
of a life estate followed by a power in the life tenant to convey
in fee simple there is a life estate with n added power of aliena-
tion, and to this there can be no objection.
In conclusion it may be well to point out the present state
of the law in other jurisdictions. Besides Virginia and West
Virginia it seems that Tennessee and Michigan have this rule
which defeats the intent of the testator. 14 Contra to these are
England, Canada and no less than twenty-two of our states. 12
The number probably would be greater were it not for statutes
in some of the rest of the states. Men do make such provisions
in wills and they will continue to do so regardless of the rules of
law of which they are and will remain ignorant. If this rule is
retained it will continue to defeat the intent of testators fre-
quently in the years to come. It is submitted the rule of law has
nothing to commend it and that it furnishes a trap for the man
who -makes a will.
-JAMs W. SIMONTON.
11 The cases are collected in an exhaustive note in 36 A. L. R. 1218.
12 See collection of cases in 36 A. L. R. 1180.
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